On the design of knowledge tranfer mechanism: applying the incomplete contracts model to developments in biotechnology. by Debackere, Koenraad & Clarysse, B
DEPARTEMENTTOEGEPASTE 
ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9703 
ON THE DESIGN OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
MECHANISMS: APPLYING THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 
MODEL TO DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Koenraad Debackere 
8art Clarysse 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69,  8-3000  Leuven  , . ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9703 
On the Design of Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms: 
Applying the Incomplete Contracts Model to Developments 
in Biotechnology 
D/1997  /2376/03 
by 
Koenraad Debackere 
Bart Clarysse ON THE DESIGN OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER MECHANISMS: 
ApPLYING THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODEL TO DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY! 
KOENRAADDEBACKERE 
Department of Applied Economics 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69 






De Vlerick School voor Management 
Universiteit Gent 
Bellevue 6 
B-9050 Gent (Belgium) 
JANUARY 1997 
1  This  research  was  supported  by  grants  from  the  Belgian  National  Fund  for  Scientific  Research 
(N.F.W.O., Brussels) and by IWT, Brussels. ON THE DESIGN OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER MECHANISMS: 
ApPLYING THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODEL TO DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a framework on how different mechanisms for knowledge transfer can be 
linked  to  the  underlying  technological  life-cycle.  Drawing  on  recent  insights  from  the 
organizational economics literature, we  analyze the design of knowledge transfer mechanisms 
and structures from an incentive point of view.  The basic version of the incomplete contracts 
model (or property rights model) was adapted to include knowledge as an asset. Several empirical 
hypotheses  can  be  derived  from  this  model.  They  are  contrasted  with  other  theoretical 
approaches to model organizational growth and development, as we are specifically interested in 
the use of new ventures creation as a technology transfer mechanism. Using this framework as a 
starting point, a limited empirical test is conducted in two sub-fields of modern biotechnology: 
monoclonal antibodies and protein engineering. The results are interesting: the property rights 
model may add to current insights on spin-offs as a mechanism for knowledge transfer as well as 
to a better understanding of the incentive structures that influence an organization's decision to 
enter a technological collaboration with a university or another biotech firm. 
--2--ON THE DESIGN OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER MECHANISMS: 
ApPLYING THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODEL TO DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
In most Western economies, governments are stimulating the transfer of the fundamental knowledge 
available in their public research laboratories and universities for commercial application and purpose 
(e.g.  Aldrich  and Sasaki,  1995;  Roberts  and  Malone,  1996;  Van Dierdonck and  Debackere,  1988). 
Academic institutions all around the world have developed a myriad of mechanisms to  appropriate the 
benefits from the creativity of their researchers and research groups (Van Dierdonck, Debackere and 
Engelen,  1990).  On the  demand  side,  rapid  technological change  and  the  increased  complexity  of 
knowledge  have  enhanced  the  interest  of established  firms  to  design  and  to  enter  into  research 
collaborations with academia (Debackere et aI.,  1996; Rogers and Gibson,  1994). As a consequence, 
both industry  and academia have constructed a  broad range of governance mechanisms  to  underpin 
their collaborative research activities.  However, practice shows  that those  initiatives  have  met with 
mixed  success.  Research  consortiums  such  as  MCC in micro-electronics  or SEMA  TECH in  semi-
conductors were successful in a limited number of research fields, mostly those where the technology 
was most mature (Rogers and Gibson, 1994). The use of patent offices to set up license contracts seems 
to have little effect in most scientific domains  (Nelsen,  1991). Finally, policies aimed at stimulating 
entrepreneurial behavior have resulted  in  successes that are  often  ambiguous  (Roberts  and  Malone, 
1996; Roberts,  1991). As a result,  those "practice" results demand for  a better understanding of the 
factors that determine the boundaries of research between universities and industry. 
Given this  growing number of approaches to  knowledge transfer,  and  taking into  account the many 
difficulties  they  encounter,  an  increasing  number of scholars  have  directed  their  attention  towards 
explaining the causes and consequences of research collaborations. A first stream of research builds on 
the  neo-classic  economic  premises  and  treats  the  choice  to  collaborate  as  a  function  of  the 
appropriability regime (Grossman and Shapiro, 1985; Katz, 1986; Kesteloot and DeBondt, 1993; Levin 
and Reiss,  1988; Ordover and Willig, 1985; Sinha and Cusumano,  1991). These studies often adopt a 
rather static  approach and focus  on pre-competitive research collaboration among rivals that already 
compete  in  existing  markets.  The  results  of these  studies  tend  to  be  sensitive  to  the  restricting 
assumptions underlying the model2,  which limits their practical relevance in studying the optimization 
of various forms of knowledge transfer. 
2 Most studies focus on the  incentives to  collaborate that rivals  have  in  a symmetric  industry.  This 
means that it is hard to extrapolate their results to university-industry collaborations or to collaborations 
between very small and large companies. 
--3--A second research agenda draws upon the insights transaction cost economics offers to understand the 
evolution  towards  new  structures  of research  governance  (Ouchi  and  Bolton,  1988;  Tapon,  1989; 
Williamson,  1975). Unlike the neo-classic stream which focuses on firms  as  production functions and 
considers the existing market structure to be a main determinant of know-how transfer, transaction cost 
economics stresses the importance of the costs of organizing and transacting knowledge exchanges as a 
determinant of the research boundaries between industry and universities (Besanko et aI.,  1995)  .. Pisano 
(1990) was among the first to empirically address some of the insights offered by this stream of thought. 
He explores the research boundaries of large firms in the pharmaceutical industry. Among other results, 
he finds  that the 'number of suppliers available' to  conduct biotechnology research (namely the small 
biotech companies) within a certain application. area,  influences the make-or-buy decision within large 
pharmaceutical  companies.  Based  on  this  observation,  he  concludes  that  small-numbers  bargaining 
stemming from specialized R&D capabilities is one of the driving forces behind the decision to do· in-
house  research.  The transaction cost framework relies  heavily  on market imperfections  which make 
collaboration between self-interested parties difficult or almost impossible.  Although this  framework 
offers  a  possibility  to  analyze  collaborations  between  small  and  large  firms,  its  application  to  the 
analysis of knowledge transactions in which one or both partners are public research institutes, remains 
limited. Clearly, when the research boundaries of the firm are changing, as  witnessed by the growing 
number  of transfer  mechanisms  and  institutional  arrangements  that  foster  research  collaborations, 
additional theoretical insights are needed. 
In the meanwhile, the institutional economic debate on the theory of the firm has ventured into models 
that explain the boundaries of the firm in terms of the incentives resulting from asset ownership (Hart, 
1989) as  well  as  the complementarities that arise amongst asset ownership, job design and incentive 
systems as intra-firm practices (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). While addressing the incentives issue 
related  to  asset  ownership,  Grossman,  Hart  and  Moore  (1986,  1990)  introduced  the  'incomplete 
contracts  model.'  The  model  shows  how  the  inability  to  write  complete  contracts  determines  the 
distribution of asset ownership among various agents.  It has  been further elaborated by  Brynjolfsson 
(1994)  to  include  information  as  an  asset.  Adopting  Brynjolfsson's  (1994)  approach,  we  model 
knowledge as a separate asset to better understand the genesis of different modes of knowledge transfer. 
This stance opens new perspectives for the analysis on the incentives to  transfer know-how and it will 
be  used  throughout this  paper as  a starting point for  analyzing the  'optimal'  application of different 
modes of technology transfer. 
In  addition  to  modeling  knowledge  as  a separate asset,  we  also  address  the  "static"  nature  of most 
knowledge transfer models developed sofar. As shown previously, technological progress is  a dynamic 
process in which the nature of the technology or knowledge changes over time. Continuous changes are 
often related  to  progress  along a technological trajectory defined by  a technological paradigm while 
discontinuities are associated with the emergence of  a new paradigm (Dosi, 1982).· His likely that the 
diffusion of knowledge and the optimal governance modes to  stimulate this knowledge transfer will be 
--4--different in the different stages of technological development. Therefore, we explicitly incorporate the 
stage of technological development as an explanation for differences in knowledge transfer. 
The remainder of the  paper is  structured as  follows.  We begin  with  a brief literature review and  an 
elaboration of the incomplete contracts model to  include knowledge as  an  asset.  Subsequent sections 
discuss the hypotheses which can be derived from this basic model and describe the data on which the 
empirical test of the model is based. Finally, we  analyze the results and draw conclusions for further 
research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
From Neo-Classic Economics towards Property Rights Models: An Overview. As mentioned in the 
introduction,  one  reason  why  theories  fail  to  provide  an  insight  into  the  motives  for  research 
collaborations or knowledge transfer lies in their more fundamental weakness of explaining the research 
boundaries  of the  firm.  For  instance,  neo-classic  economic  theory  views  the  firm  as  a  production 
function. A particular firm is assumed to choose the optimal level of R&D expenditure based on its own 
probability of success in R&D, that of its  rival firm and the exact nature of the project, measured in 
terms of appropriability (Katz, 1986; Sinha and Cusumano, 1991). Success in R&D is usually measured 
in terms of a certain "prize," which is  often approximated by the expected net present value of future 
profits. However, in practice, basic research seems not to be solely driven by the firm's profit motive, 
but to  a  large  extent by  the  logic  of scientific  advance  as  perceived  by  the  scientists  (Rappa and 
Debackere, 1993&1995; Tapon, 1989:199). 
The  transaction  cost  model  turns  the  attention  from  an  analysis  of production  costs  towards  the 
coordination or transaction costs of internal organization. The fundamentals of transaction cost theory 
date back to  Coase (1937), who stated that organizations exist because, in certain circumstances, they 
minimize transaction costs in a more efficient way  than spot markets do. An important aspect of the 
theory  is  that  the  nature  of the  transaction3  will  influence  the  costs  associated  with  it  and  hence 
determine  the  optimal  way  of organizing this  transaction (with  hierarchies  and  spot markets  as  two 
extreme forms  of organization). Translated to  a research environment,  the nature of the  "know-how" 
which is transferred from university to industry will determine the costs associated with this transaction. 
Because of the complex nature of knowledge, the large amount of uncertainty involved with it and  the 
relatively long-term orientation of research, Teece (1988) concluded that transaction costs involved in 
3 Building on Williamson's (1985) summary, Milgrom and Roberts (1992:30) distinguish five attributes 
of transactions which may influence transaction costs: (a) the level to which the investments associated 
with the  transaction are specific to  this  transaction; (b) the frequency with which similar transactions 
occur and  the  duration or period of time  over which  they  are  repeated;  (c  ) the  complexity of the 
transsaction  and  the  uncertainty  about  what  performance  will be  required;  (d)  the  difficulty  of 
measuring performance in  the  transaction  and  (e)  the  connectedness of the  transactions  involving 
other people. 
--5--knowledge  transfer  may  make  in-house  research  the  only  viable  alternative.  Unfortunately,  neither 
Williamson  (1985),  who  championed  the  theory  into  management research,  nor Teece (1988)  who 
applied it to analyze transactions on the market for know-how have defined the exact nature of these 
costs. 
In addition to  the transaction cost model, the principal-agent model has become increasingly important 
over the past fifteen years (Holmstrom, 1979). In contrast to transaction cost economics, which focuses 
on  the  "transaction"  as  the main  unit of analysis,  principal-agency theory  builds  on the  neo-classic 
assumptions  to  explain managerial decisions  within  the  firm  (Eisenhardt,  1989;  Holmstrom,  1979). 
Rooted in information economics and risk sharing theory, the principal-agent model uses information 
asymmetry  as  a  crucial  element  in  explaining  owner-manager  or  supervisor-employee  relations. 
Because the principal is not able to observe directly the amount of effort spent by an agent, an incentive 
problem arises4. Quite recently, Holmstrom (1989), using an extended version5 of this model, derived 
the hypothesis that smaller firms have a competitive advantage over large firms in conducting highly 
innovative  research.  Larger firms  have  a  mix  of highly  innovative  and  highly routine  tasks  which 
introduce incentive problems according to  this model.  Small firms  avoid these problems by focusing 
solely on highly innovative tasks. Notwithstanding the interesting results derived from the principal-
agent models  discussed  so far,  these  models  do  not  yet get  to  the  core of the  knowledge  transfer 
problem because their results  do  not depend  on the  organizational  location  of the  agency  relation 
(Holmstrom, 1989). 
Hence, each of the economic theories described above, needs additional elaboration to help explain the 
technology transfer decision. Or to use Hart's (1989: 1764) words: 
4 In a basic principal-agent model, the agent's performance can be written as:  X= E + c with X as  a 
measure of the agents performance, E  is  the amount of effort an agent puts in the project and  c is  a 
normally distributed error term of which the variance v is beyond the control of the agent. The principal 
is unable to observe E, but can measure X.  An incentive contract specifies the payment seX)  when X 
occurs. The net benefit of the contract for the principal depends on the total performance of the agent X 
minus the amount the principal pays for it in an incentive contract, namely seX). The net benefit for the 
agent is a function of his incentives seX) and the cost of effort c(E), modified by a parameter of absolute 
risk aversion,  r.  Assuming that the agent has an exponential utility function,  his  net benefit takes the 
form of exp{ -r(s(X)-c(E)}. The incentive problem with  which  the  manager is  confronted  with,  then 
boils down to choose s so that it optimizes the agents efforts without burdening him too much with risk. 
The reduced linear form of such an optimal incentive contract can be written as s(X)= ax+b with a is a 
piece rate contingent upon his performance and b is a flat salary component, which basically serves to 
make the agent participate in  the project. Optimizing the net benefit for agent and principal gives the 
following  result:  a=(1+kr<y)"I.  The intuition  behind  this  result  is:  the  agent's commission  (variable 
component) and hence his share to the profits is  higher,  when  his aversion to risk is  lower (lower r), 
when the variance of the error term is lower (lower <Y)  and when his openness to  incentives is  lower 
(lower k). 
5 The extended version allows an agent to  perform various  'activities.' The basic insight derived· from 
this model is  that mixing activities with a different variance in  the error term (in other words some of 
which are easy to measure and some of which are difficult to  measure), introduces incentive problems. 
In an optimal setting, both activities should be carried out by different persons. We refer to Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1989) fora detailed discussion of this model. 
--6--"All the theories discussed so far  suffer from the same weakness:  while they  throw 
light on  the nature of contractual failure,  none explains in  a convincing or rigorous 
manner how bringing a transaction into the firm mitigates this failure." 
In  order to  build  a  more  comprehensive  theory  on  the  boundaries  of the  finn,  Hart  together  with 
Grossman (1986) and Moore (1990), elaborated  the "property rights model." A key assumption ofthis 
model is that in practice, unlike in agency theory where the principal aims to write an optimal incentive 
contract,  most  contracts  written  by  organizations  are  incomplete.  A  number  of elements  make  it 
impossible to  write complete contracts:  First,  the  managers  who  write contracts are confronted  with 
what  Simon  (1957)  has  defined  as  "bounded  rationality."  This  means  that  on  the  one  hand  new 
contingencies may  arise which  are not specified in  the contract or on  the  other hand companies may 
simply find it too costly to specify all existing contingencies in a contract. Next, it might be impossible 
to measure the performance of the transactions specified in the contract. Especially knowledge transfer 
might only have results which can be  observed on  the  long term.  The complexity of such a transfer 
makes  it impossible to  capture it in  a contract.  Hence,  the  scope of the contract will  generally be a 
negative  function  of the  complexity  of the  subject  and  the  probability  of unexpected  contingencies 
during  the  term of the contract (uncertainty).  In  other  words,  certain rights  will  be specified  in  the 
contract, but there remain "residual rights" that are not contracted for. In general, when these residual 
rights relate to the use of an asset, the owner of that asset will retain control over them. For instance, if a 
research contract between a university lab and a biotechnology finn says nothing about 'updating' the 
equipment used, then it is the owner of that equipment who decides whether to update it or not. 
Property  Rights:  Modeling  Knowledge  as  a  Separate  Asset.  The  discussion  in  the  previous 
paragraph suggests that the party that holds the residual rights to some of the essential assets or, more 
specifically, that is the owner of these assets will increase its ex-post bargaining position in the deal. In 
our  example,  the  owner  of the  medical  equipment  will  decide  whether  to  update  it  or  not.  If,  for 
instance,  the  owner  is  the  university  lab  and  if an  update  of its  medical  equipment  significantly 
increases  the  value  of the  output for  the  other  party,  i.c.  the  biotechnology  firm,  then  the  ex-post 
bargaining power of the university lab will be inefficiently large. Basically, the biotech firm will rely on 
the goodwill of the lab to  update its equipment (under the assumption that no comprehensive contract 
can  be  written  to  deal  with  this  problem).  If,  on  the  other hand,  the owner of the  equipment is  the 
biotech firm and if the update of the equipment is most beneficial for this firm,  then the university lab 
will bear the risk of going unpaid for the re-training of its researchers to work with this new equipment. 
This  situation  is  called  the  incentive  dilemma under incomplete contracts.  The Grossman,  Hart and 
Moore framework (further abbreviated as  GHM) suggests that this  dilemma can be mitigated if those 
parties  that control the most essential  means  of production are  given  an  essential  amount of ex-post 
bargaining power resulting from asset ownership. 
--7 --The initial framework only includes the physical, non-human assets such as machines or equipment. Of 
course, in many high technology industries not only the physical assets may play an important role in 
producing  value.  Also  'knowledge  assets'  will  be  an  important  part  of the  value  creating  chain. 
Following Brynjolfsson's (1994) work6, we have extended this initial model to include these knowledge 
assets in the property rights framework. Including knowledge as  a separate asset in  the model though, 
introduces  the  question  of alienability.  Physical  assets  are  almost  by  definition  alienable.  One  can 
always  trade  the  rights  of ownership  to  that  asset.  For knowledge  assets,  alienability  is  not  that 
straightforward. A key question that should be addressed is then as follows: under what circumstances is 
knowledge  alienable  and  what  are  the  underlying  social  and  technical  dimensions  that  make  it 
alienable? 
Only if knowledge is  alienable,  one can consider the full  option of jointly owning the physical and 
knowledge assets. When there is  a high degree of complementarity between both assets,  this may be 
considered as  the most efficient way of organizing. The relative price at which one asset then can be 
transferred towards the owner of the other asset, will determine whether it is more efficient to transfer 
the know-how assets towards the owner of the physical assets or vice versa. However, if knowledge is 
not alienable, one can only pose the question whether the party that has the knowledge should own the 
physical  assets  as  well  or  whether  another party  should have  the  ownership rights  to  them.  Under 
conditions of high complementarity between both assets, this single ownership option may be a second-
best  alternative  to  the  joint ownership  option.  Brynjolfsson  (1994,  pp.  1652)  calls  the  difference 
between  the  values  created  between  the  two  alternatives  "the  value  of alienability."  Both  the 
alienability of knowledge as  an  asset and  the complementarity between the physical and knowledge 
assets  are  now  hypthesized  to  shape  the  organizational  structures  and  subsequently,  the  research 
boundaries of the firm, in modern biotechnology research. 
A Dynamic View on the Property Rights Model. A  second dilemma facing many models used  to 
assess research collaborations (or the boundaries of R&D) is their static nature. This is in sharp contrast 
to  the empirical studies  which  suggest that technology evolution is  best described  by  a  punctuated 
equilibrium model (Anderson and Tushman,  1990; Tushman and Anderson,  1986). Using data from a 
number of industries, Tushman and Anderson  (1986 &  1990) show that technology evolves through 
periods of incremental change punctuated by technological breakthroughs that for the existing firms can 
be either competence enhancing or competence destroying. Periods of technological breakthroughs are 
often associated with  the emergence of a new technological paradigm; while incremental changes are 
related to  progress along a technological trajectory defined by a technological paradigm (Dosi,  1982). 
Technology distinguishes  itself from basic science in  the  pre-paradigmatic phase in  the sense that it 
includes the search for an optimal set of heuristics to develop a new commercializable product, whereas 
basic  scientific  work  aims  to  solve  problems  of  scientific  relevance  not  necessarily  taking  the 
6 Brynjolfsson extended the property rights model with information assets as a variable. 
--8--commercial side into account (Debackere et al.,  1994). Characteristic for the pre-paradigmatic stage is 
that knowledge is difficult to communicate. Different research groups  'compete' to find the right set of 
solutions  to  further  develop  the  technology.  Once  this  set  of solutions  is  found,  a  technological 
paradigm emerges which can  be  both competence enhancing or competence destroying.  Competence 
enhancing means that the new technology enforces the value of the complementary assets in hands of 
the existing firms,  while competence destroying means  that new complementary assets are  needed to 
commercialize the technology (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). 
Modeling Knowledge Transfers. Based on the discussion in the previous paragraph, we conclude that 
changes in the "alienability" of knowledge and  changes in the complementarity between the physical 
and  knowledge assets  are both  good  candidates  to  model  technical  progress  from  a property  rights 
perspective. 
We depart from the initial situation in which knowledge is  not alienable and there exists an optimal 
degree  of complementarity  between  the  knowledge  and  physical  assets.  This  means  that  both  the 
physical assets and knowledge assets cannot create any value when they are not used in combination 
with  each  other.  One  can  think of such  situations  in  the  pre-paradigmatic  phases  of technological 
development (Dosi, 1982). The knowledge assets are strongly tied with the top scientists or engineers 
that perform the research.  The complementary physical assets  7  are  embodied in  the  (in  some  cases 
highly specialized) equipment these people use. Without the equipment, the scientists or engineers can 
not make any progress. The equipment itself does not add  any  value in  the process of technological 
development unless it is used by those who control the knowledge assets. 
Consider  now  the  case  in  which  these  both  assets  are  controlled  by  different  agents.  In  the  pre-
paradigmatic phase of technological development, it is  very difficult to predict the "outcome" of one's 
research efforts. In terms of the property rights model,  there are too  many contingencies involved to 
write a comprehensive contract. In the absence of such a contract, the engineer or scientist who creates 
some potential value is subject to  hold-up by the agent who controls the physical assets. For instance, 
the university or company in which the researcher is  employed can threaten to withhold the  necessary 
equipment and use it for other purposes. On the other hand, also the employer faces a hold-up problem 
because  the  engineer or  scientist can  leave  the  company  or university  which  makes  the  equipment 
obsolete. Therefore, both parties will bargain for  the division of the total  marginal benefit created by 
their  marginal  efforts  (under  Nash  bargaining,  each  party  gets  112  of the  marginal  value).  In  the 
equilibrium, each party will invest till the marginal cost of the investment equals the marginal benefits. 
The property  rights  model,  which  includes  knowledge  as  an  asset then  generates  the  following  first 
order conditions (the top scientists are indexed by  I and the other party by 2): 
7  It should  be noted  that  in  the  pre-paradigmatic phase the  complementary assets do  not  include the 
distribution  channels  and  other  assets  needed  to  'commercialize'  the  technology,  but the  equipment 
used to develop this technology. 
--9--(la) 
(lb) 
with Ap, =  physical assets and AK =  knowledge assets 
v 1 and v2 the  marginal benefit for each of the parties 
and c' I,c'2 the marginal cost of investment each of the parties faces. 
As the second term in equation (la) and (lb) is zero (the physical assets and the knowledge assets are 
useless when they are not used in combination with each other), each party faces the total marginal cost 
of investment but only captures half of the marginal benefits. Therefore both parties will under-invest 
and asset ownership should be given to one of  them. 
From an incentive point of view, ownership on both assets should be given to either one of the parties. 
Which one ultimately depends upon the relative value of the physical assets  versus  the  value of the 
technology. In the pre-paradigmatic stage,  where knowledge is  highly inalienable, it is  clear that the 
best option would be to give the residual ownership rights to that party which possesses the knowledge 
as  well, i.c. the engineers or scientists. In other words, the analytic model developed in equations (la) 
and  (lb)  indicates  that,  in  the  pre-paradigmatic  phase,  engineers  or  scientists  will  have  optimal 
incentives to develop a technology if they receive the residual ownership rights to the physical assets as 
well.  A  practical implication of this  analysis  is  that technology transfer,  in such a  pre-paradigmatic 
stage, should be realized through stimulating spin-off companies, in which the key researchers own the 
physical assets (von Glinow and Mohrman, 1991). 
Once a technological paradigm has emerged and knowledge becomes alienable at a decreasing price, 
the model changes. Then, the relevant question is not anymore who should jointly own the knowledge 
and the physical assets, but which part of the knowledge or physical assets can "in an optimal solution" 
be transferred to a second party. Let us take the example of a new technology based firm which wants to 
pursue three research projects. It has the choice between "outsourcing" one of the projects to an agent 
who has the most up to date knowledge to finish this project (e.g. a research lab at the university) or to 
perform them all in-house. When research lab  1 owns the  'research project' or knowledge asset AKI 
then the first order conditions for this research lab are8: 
8  The division of bargaining  power is  calculated  by  using the Shapley  value  (Shapley,  1953).  The 
Shaply value  in  the  three  agent case can  be derived  as  follows:  Agent  1 can  be  in  four  coalitions: 
{ 1,2,3), {1,2),  { 1,3)  and {I). The probability of being in each of those coalitions is  1/3,  1/6,  1/6 and 
\/3, respectively. 
--10-- _ I"~ with AKI = knowledge asset for research project 1 
and ai= private information 
v 1 the marginal benefit for party 1 
and c' 1 the marginal cost of investment party 1 faces. 
Alternatively, if all the "knowledge" is owned by the biotechnology firm,  then the first order condition 
for the research lab can be written as: 
(2b) 
Again,  in  those cases where the knowledge which can be obtained from the research project is  only 
"weakly complementary" with the other knowledge assets (other research programs) of the technology 
based firm,  then it is  beneficial from an  incentive point of view to  out-source the project while the 
specialized research lab itself retains the property rights to the knowledge involved in the latter project. 
One  might  think  of such  a  situation  as  a  research  collaboration  between  a  university  and  a  new 
technology based firm in which the technology based firm licenses or out-sources a part of its research 
program to the university. From the point of view of the university, this means that technology transfer 
becomes possible through patent vehicles. 
Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the most important policy insights which can be derived from 
the  property rights  model.  The two  key  dimensions  which  play in  the model  are:  (a)  the degree of 
complementarity between the physical and knowledge assets or among the knowledge assets themselves 
and (b) the  alienability of knowledge. The reasoning is as  follows:  in the pre-paradigmatic stages of 
technology development, knowledge is not alienable. If, in these stages, the physical assets to  generate 
or further develop the technology are of crucial importance, then these assets should be in hands of the 
scientists or engineers that embody the knowledge assets (equations (la) and (lb)). If not,  the residual 
rights  are  in  hands  of  the  organization  which  owns  the  physical  assets,  which  in  turn  creates 
disincentives for the researchers. Hence, in the early stages of technological development, stimulating 
spin-off companies might be the most appropriate choice of technology transfer9. 
Once  the  technology  becomes  more  mature  (e.g.  once  a  technological  paradigm  is  established), 
knowledge turns out to  be alienable through the use of property rights10. At this stage, equations (2a) 
9 Note that this argument does not depend on whether industry or universities are the main institutional 
sources  of this  technology.  Spin-offs  occur from  both types  of organizations.  In  practice,  the  semi-
conductor industry is an example where spin-offs mainly resulted from existing electronics companies, 
whereas the biotechnology industry represents a context where spin-offs were mainly university driven. 
10 Patents are only one form of property rights which guarantee knowledge alienability. Other property 
rights which are determined by common law include property rights and to a lesser extent trade secrets 
(that are covered by the trade secret law). Still other property rights do not find their roots in common 
law; though in a mutual respect by the industrial partners or consumers (Kay,  1993). Reputation and to 
a lesser extent trademarks are  an  example of these  kinds  of property  rights.  We  refer  to  Besen and 
--11--and  (2b)  suggest that  new  technology  based  firms  have  an  incentive  to  look for  other partners  to 
perform their basic research activities with as long as the knowledge involved in these new activities is 
only 'weakly' complementary to the existing physical assets and to the existing knowledge assets. One 
can think of new  technology  based companies  which  have  developed  or commercialized  their core 
technologies  and  now  look  for  universities  or  specialized  firms  to  supply  knowledge  which  is 
complementary to but not too much entangled with the core knowledge they have in-house and with the 
different physical assets which they have accumulated. In these technical sub-fields, universities can set 
up patenting offices to commercialize their technology. In other words, research laboratories that want 
to  perform contract research for existing companies should take into account that,  from an  incentive 
point  of view,  these  companies  will  be  most  willing  to  out-source  projects  which  belong  to  the 
technological sub-fields outlined above. 
The analytic  model  also  suggests  two  corollaries.  First,  in  a  pre-paradigmatic  stage  of technology 
development, it is less optimal to stimulate research collaboration between university and industry. The 
reason is straightforward: every time a research laboratory or a university department has developed a 
sufficient critical  mass,  the  researchers  have  an  optimal  incentive  to  spin  off their own  company. 
Attempts from the university to  commercialize their knowledge through research may create ex ante 
disincentives to  invest in the development of this knowledge. On the other side, collaboration efforts 
undertaken by  the industrial  partners  do  not  succeed  because  the  researchers  lack the  incentive  to 
collaborate on a long term basis. Second, once knowledge becomes alienable, this does not mean that 
spin-off companies are  not fruitful  anymore.  The model only  suggests  that there  is  an  incentive  to 
collaborate, maybe in specialized sub-domains, either with other new technology based companies or 
with the universities themselves. One can think of universities that choose to  bundle their knowledge 
resources  and  form  a  semi-independent  company  that  acts  as  a  catalyst  between  the  'generalist' 
companies that already existed and the university laboratories themselves. 
These  ideas  are  summarized  in  Figure  I  below.  In  this  model,  we  further  assume  that  when  the 
technology is  still in its pre-paradigmatic stage and the complementarity of assets is low,  participation 
in informal technological communities and the researcher networks that develop in their context, might 
be the  better solution  to  the  knowledge  transfer  process.  In  case  technology  is  well-articulated  and 
complementarity of assets  is  high,  the (multi-partner) consortia are hypothesized  to  provide a viable 
transfer mechanism.  Hence the four quadrants  modeled in  Figure  1.  However, in  the context of this 
paper, we will focus on the trade-off between the formation of a new venture (the so-called "spin-off' 
company) and  the development of a research collaboration, as indicated by the direction of the arrow 
drawn in Figure 1. 
Raskind  (1991)  for  an  oversight  of the  intellectual  property  rights  and  their  impact  on  economic 
activity. 
--12--Figure 1: Technology Transfer From A Property Rights Point of View 
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ALIENABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
So far, we specified how the incomplete contracts model might contribute to an increased insight in the 
process  of knowledge  transfer,  defined  from  an  incentives  perspective.  The  analytic  model  now 
generates a set of empirically testable hypotheses, that are further developed in the next session. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
One of the first insights derived from the property rights model is the relationship between the stage of 
technology development and the number of foundings in the industry. The underlying rationale is that in 
the pre-paradigmatic stages of technology development, the knowledge associated with this technology 
is  inalienable.  From an  incentive  point of view,  the  model  shows  that in  this  case the  scientists  or 
engineers who  develop the knowledge should  own  the physical  assets  needed  to  develop it.  In  other 
words,  they  are  stimulated  to  found  their  own  technology  based  company.  Once  that  knowledge 
becomes  more  alienable,  we  might  hence  expect less  foundings  based  on  the  technology.  Hence,  a 
negative  relationship  is  supposed  between  the  number  of new  technology  based  foundings  in  a 
technological community and the alienability of knowledge in that community. 
In  order to  empirically test this  relationship,  we should control for competing explanations that have 
been  developed  in  the  literature as  (community-level) explanations  for  organizational  founding.  The 
--13--most extensive and most elaborated among them is  'organizational ecology.' Organizational ecologists 
have incorporated the study of founding as  a focal topic in  their research agenda (see Table  1,  for an 
overview). Their main argument is that population-level dynamics shape the patterns of founding. In the 
early eighties, Delacroix and Carroll (1983) empirically investigated this  hypothesis in a population of 
Argentine New Papers. They found a curvilinear relationship between population density, measured as 
the  number  of organizations  at  any  period  in  time,  and  the  founding  rates  in  the  populations  under 
study.  The  theoretical  explanation  is  as  follows:  organizational  density  is  determined  by  the  prior 
failures and the prior foundings in a population. Both dimensions have this curvilinear relationship with 
founding patterns. Prior failures, at first hand, create free-floating resources which could be accessed by 
newly founded organizations. However, this positive influence has an upper limit beyond which an even 
larger number of failures would signal that the environment is  hostile towards potential entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, foundings initially encourage potential entrepreneurs because in a similar population or niche 
because they signal that the environment is fertile. But as the number of foundings increases, an upper 
limit  is  reached  beyond  which  competition  for  resources  in  this  environment  discourages  further 
foundings. 
-- Insert Table 1 about here --
This initial hypothesis has been further elaborated as the  'density-dependence' hypothesis. The density 
dependence hypothesis states, in general, that initially population density legitimates the organizational 
form of a new popUlation and helps to increase the founding rate of this  new population. However, as 
the population density further increases, the legitimacy process becomes dominated by the competition 
effect and founding rates start decreasing. As a result,  one expects an  inverted U-shaped relationship 
between population density and founding rates. This hypothesis has been validated in a large number of 
different populations, ranging from the  US  Brewery Industry  towards  US  Semiconductor companies 
and  even the  US  biotech industry.  As shown  by  Table  1,  in  most of these different populations,  the 
density-dependence  hypothesis  has  received  empirical  support.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that  the 
evidence in  support of the  non-monotonic pattern is  very  strong and should  be  controlled for in  our 
study of the effect of knowledge alienability on organizational foundings. 
Based on the discussion of the previous paragraphs, a first hypothesis or research proposition derived 
from the model is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: after controlling for population density, the alienability of  knowledge 
in a  new technological domain,  will have a  negative  effect on the 
number of foundings in that domain. 
As a corollary to  this,  the model also predicts that the number of research collaborations in a particular. 
technological  domain  will  be  a negative  function  of these  organizational  foundings.  Organizations 
--14--which want to collaborate with research groups do not have the possibility to do so, because the existing 
groups do not have enough incentives. On the contrary, once a research group obtains a critical mass of 
knowledge, it has an optimal incentive to spin-off its own company. Concluding, we can formulate the 
following corollary: 
Corollary 1: there is a negative relationship between the number of  foundings in a 
particular domain and the number of  research collaborations in that 
domain. 
The property rights model does not only focus on foundings as a viable strategy of technology transfer. 
Equation (2a) and (2b) show that, once knowledge has become alienable, new technology based firms 
have an  incentive to  enter research collaborations with  external partners  in  those technological sub-
fields  where  the  knowledge involved is  only  weakly  complementary to  their physical assets  and  the 
knowledge  assets  within  the  company.  In  line  with  the  core competence  literature,  new  technology 
based  companies  are  assumed  to  enter a research  collaboration in  those  technological  sub-fields in 
which they do not have their core knowledge or physical assets. 
Based on this,  we argue that, before an organization is  willing to  enter a research collaboration (be it 
with a university or another biotech firm),  the organization should already have developed a more or 
less  coherent set of 'knowledge'  and  a well-elaborated set of physical  assets  which  form  the  'core 
competence' of the company (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). As a consequence, we state that the decision 
to enter a research collaboration is a positive function of the resources which a particular company has 
accumulated, both in terms of knowledge and physical assets. Hypothesis 2,  derived from the property 
rights model, is then formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: after controlling for the level of  knowledge alienability, the decision 
of  a new technology based firm to enter a research collaboration is a 
positive  function  of its  accumulated  stock  of knowledge  in  the 
technology. 
Hypothesis 2b: after controlling for the level of  knowledge alienability, the decision 
of  a new technology based firm to enter a research collaboration is a 
positive function of  its accumulated stock of  physical assets. 
RESEARCH SITE: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND HYBRIDOMA TECHNOLOGY 
IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY 
The Cohen-Boyer invention in  1973 has been characterized as the breakthrough that turned the "basic 
science"  of molecular  biology  into  an  industry,  known  as  "biotechnology"  (Kenney,  1986).  Gene-
splicing technology or rDNA would, after several years of discussion, lead in  1981  to the now famous 
Cohen-Boyer patent. In short, rDNA is the technology used to cut and paste DNA strings. Although this 
was  the  pivotal  starting point for  biotechnology,  two  subsequent technological  breakthroughs  would 
--15--alter the face of the domain. In 1975, Millstein and Kohler developed the hybridoma-technology, which 
is used to 'produce monoclonal antibodies for diagnostic purposes. Much later, in the early eighties, the 
biotech community started to  focus  on "protein engineering" which combines both the  "hybridoma'" 
and  "rDNA"  technology.  Protein  engineers  basically  make  use  of  gene  splicing  and  cell  fusion 
technology to develop proteins or polypeptides with desirable therapeutic characteristics. 
It is important to note that biotechnology is a heterogeneous set of biological techniques, which are used 
for  a  variety of purposes.  The property rights  model described  above  is  not an  a  priori  'industrial' 
model, but a technology related one. Hence, not the industry, but the 'technological domain' or, to use 
organizational ecology terminology, the homogenous population of companies that are interested in the 
development or commercialization of the same technology form the appropriate unit of analysis (Gray, 
1985).  For  the  purpose  of this  paper,  we  divided  biotechnology  in  a  number  of homogenous 
technological sub-fields. 
We did so in two steps. First, we traced all companies which were active in biotechnology research with 
therapeutic  purposes  (see  Table  2  for  a  description  of how  this  population  is  constructed  and  a 
definition of the technological sub-fields identified below). Within this biopharmaceutical population, a 
number of different technological sub-fields can be  distinguished  (OTA,  1991).  Based on  a  careful 
analysis of the relevant scientific journals in the field  (see Table 2 for a list of the journals we  have 
screened) and in line with industry reports such as OTA (1991) and Ernst &  Young (1995), we were 
able to distinguish between seven technological subfields: (a) monoclonal antibodies, using hybridoma 
technology,  (b)  protein engineering  using rDNA systems,  (c)  drug  delivery  systems,  (d)  anti-sense 
technology,  (e)  gene  therapy,  (f)  intracellular  receptors  and  (g)  rational  drug  design  (using 
computerized methods). 
-- Insert Table 2 about here --
Within  those  technological  sub-fields,  there  are  very  different  types  of  organizations  involved. 
According to  Clarysse and Debackere (1996) II, 65% of all research and development groups in plant 
genetic engineering (rDNA) are housed in universities. Government funded labs account for about 10%. 
New biotechnology firms account for another 10% and about 15% is accounted for by large established 
chemical  or  seed  companies.  The  division  of "research  labor"  in  the  biopharmaceuticals  is  more 
difficult to  assess because the "research boundaries" are less clear to  define.  Debackere and Clarysse 
(1995)  estimated that for  a  particular stream of research,  namely  Hepatitis  C,  70%  of the  research 
groups  are  based  in  universities  and  university-related  hospitals.  Another  20%  was  performed  by 
government-related laboratories; while 5% resulted from the efforts of new biotechnology companies 
and  another  5%  is  performed  by  large  companies.  Since  we  are  interested  in  the  foundings  of 
II This study focuses on the use of rDNA techniques to genetically manipulate plant varieties. 
--16--
ii' independent  new  firms,  we  will  focus  on _  new  biotech  companies.  Figure  2  shows  the  relative 
importance of each technological sub-field (in 1994) for the new biotechnology start-ups. 
Figure 2: New Biotech Companies in Each Technological Sub-Field 
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Legend: When a Biotech Company was involved' in more than one technological sub-field, it was given credit for 
that one in which the majority of  its research efforts were. 
As  shown  in  Figure  2,  the  technological  sub-field  of monoclonal  antibodies  (MABS)  and  genetic 
engineering of proteins (rDNA) are by far the largest biotechnology. Together, they account for about 
45% of the new technology based companies involved in biopharmaceutical development.  Although 
rational  or  structure-based  drug  design  has  become  a  very  popular concept  in  drug  development, 
relatively little biotechnology start-ups focus on this sub-field. Increasingly popular are the domains of 
anti-sense technology and gene  therapy.  Gene therapy consists of the development of 'therapies'  in 
relation to the recombinant drugs which are helpful in treating chronic diseases such as Cystic Fibrosis. 
Anti-sense technology is  the newest sub-field and targets the RNA instead of DNA strings. By using 
this kind of technology, companies hope to be able to inhibit the replication of viruses. So far,  only a 
couple  of  leads  derived  from  anti-sense  technology  have  entered  clinical  trials.  Drug  delivery 
companies focus on the development of novel delivery systems for biologics and genes. Most of these 
companies either focus on the use of liposomes (especially the older companies among them) or the use 
of ligands. Finally, quite recently, a whole stream of biotech companies has  started to  specialize their 
activities in  the recombinant development of receptors (intracellular receptors). These companies are 
not  interested  in  the  development  of  real  'drug  agents,'  but  in  the  targets  which  enable  the 
pharmaceutical companies to develop drug agents. 
--17 --Because the  sub-fields of Monoclonal Antibodies  (Hybridoma technology)  and  Genetic Engineering 
(rDNA technology) both really were at the origin of biotechnology as an industry, they show a similar 
life cycle. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 2, together they include over 45% of the new technology 
based companies involved in biopharmaceutical research. Therefore, we decided to  focus in this paper 
on these two technological sub-fields as a population of organizations. Figure 3 lists the foundings and 
dissolutions in this population. It is  clear that the "big wave" of start-ups in  this  population is  in the 
early  eighties.  From the  mid-eighties  on,  an  increasing  number  of the  first  generation  companies 
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Legend: Number of company foundings in each year on the vertical axis. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are situated at different levels of analysis and thus they need a different 
approach. To investigate hypothesis 1, we adopt the approach by organizational ecology studies, which 
have  mostly  used  a  Poisson  model  (see  Table  1,  for  an  overview  of the  models  which  have  most 
frequently been used in the organizational ecology studies of founding). We first briefly motivate why a 
Poisson version is an appropriate way to model foundings in a population or technological community. 
Model Specification for hypothesis 1. When modeling the founding of organizations in a population, 
the  level of analysis  is  the population (Hannan and  Carroll,  1992:236). We have to  do  with repeated 
events  (Allison,  1984:51) occurring  to  one  level of  analysis: -the lJopulatiunohnterest;this-kirrd -of -------- ----- ---
process is easily modeled as an arrival or a point process (Cox and Isham,  1980:2). The entry rate is the 
--18--dependent variable in the analyses. The baseline model for comparison is always the constant rate, time 
independent Poisson model, also called the exponential model (Allison, 1984:23), describing a series of 
events, distributed randomly across time. If  we knew the dates of foundings of biotechnology firms with 
a great degree of precision (e.g. day and month of founding), then we would be able to model the entry 
rates  as  a  continuous  process,  using  a  hazard  model.  If one  uses  the  hazard  model  (or  a  related 
accelerated  failure  time  model)  to  model  the  process  of foundings,  then  one  assumes  that  the  time 
between two founding dates is the dependent variable of interest. In other words, one defines a founding 
as a discrete event which takes place at a well-known, well-defined point of time. Of course, both from 
a conceptual and  an  empirical point of view,  this  assumption is  very difficult to  hold.  Which date is 
"the" date? The founding  of an  organization seems to  be more of a process than of an  exact event. 
Hence, it makes  more sense to  estimate the  number of organizational foundings  that are expected to 
occur within a certain time interval, than to model the exact date. 
As shown by Barnett and Amburgey (1990), a Poisson process then provides a natural baseline model 
for  organizational founding.  The basic  Poisson  model  for  event count data can  be  described  as  in 
equation 6: 
-')..,(x  )  ')..,(x  )Yt 
Pr(Yt=y  )=e  t  [  t  ] 
t  Y , 
t" 
(3) 
The Poisson model holds the strong assumption that both the variance and the mean of the number of 
events are equal. This assumption is often found to be too stringent in an analysis of founding rates (see 
Ranger-Moore et aI.,  1991). Unobserved heterogeneity in the model always leads to overdispersion. A 
first way  to  correct for  this  heterogeneity would  be to  adopt a  'fixed effects approach'  by  including 
dummy variables which are niche-specific (e.g.  a dummy variable for each of the different geographic 
locations or market niches). The fixed effects approach is very attractive when no real conceptual model 
is  available which explains the distribution of the heterogeneity. However, the main disadvantages of 
these  models  are  (1)  they  absorb  a lot degrees  of freedom  (one for  each dummy  variable)  and  (2) 
parameters  of the  co-variates,  if any,  contaminate with  the  dummy  variables  and  are  therefore  very 
difficult to estimate. Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) have proposed to overcome these problems by 
letting').., vary randomly across individual units. A common way to do so is  by including equation 4 in 
equation 3 (the Poisson model), or if overdispersion is  a problem, by  incorporating equation 4 in  the 
negative binomial specification which can be derived from the baseline model (see Hausman, Hall and 
Grilliches, 1984:921): 
(4) 
where the error term  £ it is  assumed to  follow a gamma distribution,  i can be  the number of different 
niches  or popUlations  and  t  is  the  time  variable.  Of course,  the  value  of this  random effects  largely 
--\9--depends on the assumption that the errors really follow a gamma-like distribution, or in  other words, 
that the errors will be larger for larger values of A,it (in this case the number of foundings/niche/period 
of time). 
Model Specification for hypothesis 2a and 2b. In these hypotheses, we study a classic make or buy 
decision. To study these decisions, previous research has used a Probit or Logit specification (Pisano, 
1990). In line with  this research,  we choose to  use  a probit normal probability model.  This model 
belongs to the family of binary choice models. It suggests the use of a cumulative probability function, 
which is normally distributed. This probability function can be written as equation (5): 
P;=F(  a + bX;)=  F(Z;)  (5) 
where Zj is a non-observable variable. Translated in terms of our unobserved continuous variable Zj,  we 
assume that Y takes the value of 1 if the value of Zj  is  larger than a certain "critical" cut-off point Zj* 
and Y takes the value of 0 if the value of of  ~  is smaller than or equal to a certain "critical" cut-off point 
Zj*.  The probit model assumes  that this  cut-off point is  a  normally  distributed  variable so  that the 
probability  that  our  unobserved  continuous  variable  is  larger  than  ~, can  be  computed  from  the 
cumulative normal probability function, which can be written in a standardized form as equation (6): 
1  ZJi  -.<2/2 
P =  F(Z.) = ~e  ds 
I  I  -V 2n _~  (6) 
where s is a normally distributed random variable (mean=O and variance=l). By definition, the variable 
Pi lies in the (0,1) interval. The model can be interpreted as the probability that a certain organization 
enters research agreements, conditioned upon the value of the explanatory variables. 
CONSTRUCT OPERATIONALIZA  TION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The variables used in this study are explained in Table 3. In Tables 4 and 5, the results of the analyses 
are presented. 
-- Insert Table 3 about here --
Hypothesis 1 and Corollary 1. The operationalization of the density variable is straightforward: the 
number  of organizations  in  the  popUlation  (see  Figure  4).  As  shown  in  Figure  4,  the  number  of 
organizations exponentially increases in  the early eighties to  reach a summit in  1988. From then on 
mergers and acquisitions decrease the number of organizations in both technological communities. 
Knowledge alienabiiityis-more difficult to- op-eratio-nalize thanurganizational density. Arrow (l962) has 
defined  three  characteristics  which  are  typical  for  resource  allocation  on  knowledge  markets: 
--20--indivisibility,  uncertainty  and  appropriability.  Indivisibility  means  that  sometimes  parts  of  the 
knowledge cannot be separated from other parts or even from the owner of that knowledge. Uncertainty 
refers  to  the fact that investing in  knowledge does  not result in  a straightforward manner in  output. 
Hence, existing firms  may under-invest in  knowledge  because of the risk associated  with  it.  Finally, 
knowledge  appropriability  refers  to  the  extent  that  the  owner  of the  knowledge  is  able  to  extract 
economic value from  it.  All  three characteristics are  related  to  the  intangible  or  tacit nature  of this 
knowledge. Arrow (1962: 615) argued: 
" ...  with  suitable  legal  measures,  information 12  may  become  an  appropriable 
commodity. Then the monopoly power can indeed be exerted. However, no  amount of 
legal  protection  can  make  a  thoroughly  appropriable  commodity  of something  so 
intangible  as  information  ... Mobility  of personnel  among  firms  provides  a  way  of 
spreading  information.  Legally  imposed  property  rights  can  provide  only  a  partial 
barrier ...  " 
Figure 4: Number of Organizations in the 
Genetic Engineering or Hybridoma Technological Community 
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Legend: Number of new biotech firms in genetic engineering or hybridoma technologies on the vertical axis. 
The property rights model as defined in equations  (1 a)  and  (1 b)  is  consistent with this statement in a 
sense that it predicts the use of equity ownership of the personnel as a first "inner circle of protecting 
knowledge." However,  the more knowledge looses its  intangible or tacit character,  which means  the 
more it becomes codified, the better it can be traded on the spot market (von Hippel, 1994). 
12 We define knowledge assets in the way he defines information. 
--21--Hence, the codification of knowledge may be a good proxy for its alienability at any point in time. In 
pharmaceuticals,  patents  have  since  long  been  a  legal  mechanism  which  was  very  useful  both  for 
information protection and codification. In Teece's (1986) terms, we can say that the market for know 
how in pharmaceuticals has a tight appropriability regime. Figure 5, for instance, illustrates how many 
percent of the drugs introduced in the US market were also originated by the same firm. 
Figure 5: Percentage ofNME's Introduced in the US Market, Period 1960-1989 
With Manufacturing Company Different From the Originating Company 










°  0  (')  co  OJ  C\l  lC)  co  ~  "<t  I'- co  co  co  co  I'- I'- I'- co  co  co 
OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ  OJ 
Legend: Compiled from De Haen's Non-Proprietary Index & Drug Product Index, period 1960-1989. 
The data in Figure 5  indicate what percentage of the  New Molecular Entities introduced to  the  US 
market in that particular year of observation are not manufactured by the company that has discovered 
them.  It is  clear  from  this  figure  that  already  since  a  long  time,  there  is  a  difference  between 
organizations which "discover" the new entities and those which "manufacture" them and/or eventually 
market these NMEs. Only in 1987, the percentage of NMEs introduced on the US  market which were 
manufactured by  the  companies that had really discovered them was  smaller than  the percentage of 
NMEs originated by a different company. We can conclude from these results that, in economic terms, 
the appropriability regime in traditional pharmaceuticals should be rather tight. 
It  is a realistic assumption that this appropriability regime is more or less driven by the well-functioning 
of the legal protection system, the patents. The question which remains to be answered then is: does this 
patent system  also  hold  for  the  protection  of living  organisms  or other products  derived  from  the 
application  of  new  biotech  techniques?  As  extensively  described  by  Kenney  (1986),  the  patent 
controversy  came  to  an  end  with  the  1980  decision  of the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Diamont  vs. 
--22--Chakrabarty case that a live genetically engineered microorganism constitutes patentable subject matter 
within the meaning of section  101.  In other words,  from  1980 on  it  was  legally possible to  receive 
patents on a genetically manipulated micro-organism. Figure 6 shows then the number of patents filed 
in  the  US  which  can  be classified  as  'biotech patents'13.  In  1994,  the  biotech patents  filed  for  the 
genetic engineering of proteins make up over half of the total biotech patents population. Although the 
initial 'start' of this genetic engineering of proteins (better known as protein engineering) was possible 
from the 1975 on (discovery of the hybridoma technique), it took until the early eighties before it was 
further commercialized. The first patents are filed  in  1977 (although it took over five  years for these 
patents  to  be  granted).  Patent  activity  for  protein  engineering  and  monoclonal  antibodies  grew 
exponentially respectively in the mid- and early eighties. 




2000  -+-rDNA 
_Mabs 




T""  T"" 
CX)  Ol 
Ol  Ol 
Legend: Annual Number ofDS Patents Filed in Genetic Engineering (rDNA), Monoclonal Antibodies (MABS) 
and other biotech domains. 
Table 4 shows the results of the  models in  both the technological community of 'protein engineering 
companies' and the one of 'monoclonal antibody based' companies. Models (1) and (4) test the density-
13  These  patents  are  drawn  from  Derwent's  Biotechnology  Patents  file.  First,  we  selected  all  US 
Biotech patents from this file through selecting on the priority date. Only US patents have this priority 
date,  which  makes  a  selection  of them  straightforward.  The  search  strategy  to  select  those  patents 
related  to  monoclonal  antibodies  was:  (monoclon*)  and  (antibod*).  In  other  words,  in  order  to  be 
selected in the database, the patents should include both terms either in the title or in the abstract of the 
document. A similar search strategy was  formulated  to  select the  'genetic engineering', including the 
terms «recombin*) or (rDNA» and (protein*). Again patents which had·one of  the two·first.terms·and·· 
the third  term either in  the abstract or the  title  were selected from  Derwent's biotech file.  All  others 
were considered as biotech patents which were related to other technical fields. 
--23--dependence model in  these communities.  Consistent with  the  large stream of organizational ecology 
research, both equations support the inverted-U relationship between the  number of organizations that 
already exist in this industry and the number of foundings. Adding the knowledge alienability variable  14 
(see models  (2)  and  (5))  to  the model,  considerably increases the explanatory power.  In  the case  of 
monoclonal antibodies,  the  likelihood ratio  increases  with  about 44%  (the accompanying R' changes 
from  0.08  to  0.47);  while  in  the  case  of protein engineering,  the  likelihood  changes  with  13%  (the 
accompanying R2 changes from 0.28 to 0.37). Also the individual signs ofthe coefficients point into the 
expected direction and are significantly different from O. 
In an auxiliary model, we also included a time trend in model (2) and model (5). Even after controlling 
for this time trend (which was  significant in both cases), the results did  not change. The slope of the 
PATENTS variable in model (5)  was  slightly smaller (-0.008) but that did  not change its  impact.  In 
order to test to what extent these results are sensitive to the econometric specification we used, we used 
a negative binomial specification to check the stability of the results. The coefficients in models (3) and 
(6)  remain  largely the  same  with  slightly  inflated  standard  errors.  In  none of both  models  was  the 
overdispersion parameter statistically significant. The implications of these results are twofold.  First, 
they provide an  empirical test of a slightly modified version of the property rights model15.  Second, 
even after controlling for the most widely tested hypothesis on organizational foundings,  the density-
dependence model, the knowledge alienability hypothesis adds to the explained variance of the model. 
-- Insert Table 4 about here --
Qualitative research  on  the  incentive systems  used  in  biotechnology start-ups confirm the  empirical 
conclusions drawn from our quantitative models in the sense that they propose equity ownership as  an 
important incentive.  Kenney  (1986:  96), for  instance,  argued  that leading researchers  or  "founding" 
professors were given up to  10% of the initial equity. In addition to this, the remaining researchers were 
given  stock  options  as  incentives.  Data  on  the  motivations  of those  professors  to  spin-off  a  new 
company also reveal that the equity shares and, related to this, the huge amounts of money that could be 
earned  in  case  of a  success  are  ranked  as  a  primary  reason  for  their  "entrepreneurial  activity." 
Moreover, cases in  which the ownership of physical and  knowledge assets remained separate, clearly 
highlight examples  of under-investment on  both  sides  (Kenney,  1986).  Based  on  the  same  data,  he 
describes how research laboratories at universities complain that they have not the necessary equipment 
to  keep  ahead  of the  biotechnology  start-ups,  whereas  the  established  pharmaceutical  and  chemical 
firms were very skeptical towards the new biotechnology challenge. 
14 Measured as the annual patent activity in each technological community. 
IS  The reader should note that this test is only a first step in the right direction. The degrees of freedom 
in each of the models is too small to draw strong conclusions from them. 
--24--We also stated, as  a corollary, that we  expected a positive correlation between the intensity of patent 
activity and the number of research collaborations16 in the domain. Unfortunately we  were not able to 
split this variable up between the monoclonal antibodies and protein engineering. As a first indication, 
we  calculated the  Pearson point correlation between the  number of research collaborations (between 
biotechnology companies and  universities/other biotechnology companies) in  which they are involved 
over the period 1982-1994. This correlation coefficient is 0.74, which provides (be it limited) evidence 
in support of the corollary. 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b. The dependent variable  is  the  same for  both  hypotheses,  namely  a dummy 
variable which  takes  on  the  value  of 1 if the  company  has  entered  a research collaboration in  that 
particular year (see Table 3 for a description of this variable). 
-- Insert Table 5 about here --
Hypothesis 2a states that the accumulated stock of knowledge influences the decision to enter a research 
collaboration in a positive direction. We have a dIrect measure of this accumulated stock of knowledge 
through  the  cumulated  number  of patents  indicator  (CUMPAT).  Previous  research  has  used  this 
measure as  an  indicator·of the  knowledge  stock in  the  company  (Henderson  and  Cockburn,  1994). 
However, no direct measure is available to capture the amount of physical assets a biotech company has 
invested in. Instead, we use the number of projects this company has in clinical trials (CLINICAL) as a 
proxy.  Previous research on biotechnology has  argued that having products in clinical trials make it 
necessary to  invest heavily in the physical assets needed to  carry the  clinical trials.  For instance, Dr. 
Howard Simons, Director of Central Research at du Pont (Brown, 1982:9, in Kenney 1986) argued: 
"Recombinant DNA is just a way to synthesize things ... as soon as you've inserted 
the  gene,  it's  identical  to  what  you  would  do  in  the  chemical  industry 
anyway ...  development needs  investments  which cost 20 time as  much as  research 
" 
Before  testing  these  hypotheses,  we  controlled  for  a  number  of competing  explanations.  First,  we 
included the total level of knowledge alienability by measuring the patenting activity during any given 
year.  This variable is  highly correlated with the time trend  variable so  that we  omitted the latter one 
from  the  final  analyses  to  avoid  multicollinearity  problems.  We  also  controlled  for  the  size  of the 
company by using the number of employees in each company as  a proxy (SIZE) and for the age of the 
company, measured as the number of years elapsed since company founding (AGE). Models (7) and (9) 
are respectively a Probit and a Logit estimation of this  baseline model.  As  expected,  it  is  mainly the 
patent variable which explains the probability of entering a research collaboration. AGE has  a slightly 
significant and positive sign, which indicates that it are especially the more mature organizations which 
tend to enter such collaborations. 
16 We refer to table 3 for a description of how this variable is constructed. 
--25--After controlling for AGE, SIZE and PATENTS, we included the explanatory variables in the model. 
The knowledge assets which organizations have accumulated in  the field  have a significant positive 
effect  on  the  probability  that  these  organizations  enter  a  research  collaboration,  which  supports 
hypothesis  2a.  The  effect  of  the  number  of  projects  each  organization  has  in  clinical  trials 
(CLINICALS)  is  slightly  less,  but still  significant in  the  expected  way.  Hence,  also  hypothesis  2b 
receives support. Of course, the variables which we use in the model are only proxies for the constructs 
developed in the property rights model. Moreover, we have no  variable which captures the degree of 
interrelatedness  between  the  different  knowledge  assets  on  the  one  hand  and  the  knowledge  and 
physical  assets  on  the  other  hand.  We  also  have  no  indication  on  how  homogenous  the  existing 
knowledge base is and, related, how much it reflects a core competence in a certain domain. 
Qualitative analysis of the data sources, however, revealed that in many cases research collaborations 
are formed between more mature companies involved in protein engineering and monoclonal antibodies 
and the newer biotech companies or university laboratories that are involved in newer technologies such 
as gene therapy and anti-sense technology, which confirms the direction ofthe hypothesis. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In  this  paper,  we  analyzed  how  recent  developments  in  organizational  economics  can  help  us 
understand the complex process of technology transfer. The GHM incomplete contracts  or property 
rights  model,  which  has  been  the  basis  for  many recent developments  in  principal-agency  theory 
towards  a  full  theory  of the firm  (Holmstrom,  1994),  was  used  as  a starting point to  explain inter-
organizational knowledge transfers. 
The GHM model focuses  on the incentives that agents have to  cooperate or not,  given the status of 
ownership  of the  complementary  assets.  We analytically  modeled  "knowledge"  as  an  asset.  When 
knowledge is  not alienable,  the model  shows  that those  who  possess  the  knowledge  have  the  best 
incentive to develop this knowledge further if they also have the rights to the physical assets needed to 
develop this knowledge. Linking this result to the theories of technological evolution, this means that 
before a technological paradigm is established or, put differently, in the beginning of the technological 
life  cycle  (Foster,  1986),  technology  transfer  should  be  stimulated  through  the  spin-off  of  new 
technology based companies in which the key researchers receive equity rights. 
Once knowledge  becomes alienable,  the  model  gives  an  insight  in  what kind of knowledge  will  be 
outsourced by which companies. The model and subsequent analyses suggest that probably the more 
mature companies that have already developed a research portfolio, have the highest incentive to  out-
source these knowledge assets that are only weakly interrelated with either their existing portfolio or the 
physical assets they have invested in order to further develop this-portfolio. There are two conclusions 
which can be drawn from this insight. First, research laboratories that want to  perform contract research 
--26--with  existing companies should  invest in  this  kind  of knowledge.  Second,  high-tech  companies  that 
belong to a second wave of foundings have an incentive to specialize in these technological sub-fields 
and act as brokers between universities and the more mature biotech or pharmaceutical companies. 
In addition to these analytic derivations, we also made an attempt at analyzing how reality matches the 
predictions  of the  property  rights  model.  Therefore,  a  hypothetical  framework  was  developed.  To 
empirically analyze the first hypothesis, we contrasted the predictions of the property rights model with 
the competing explanations derived from organizational ecology. The empirical results,  derived from 
two biotechnology sub-fields are comforting. The knowledge alienability variable explains up to 39% of 
the yearly variation in the  number of foundings,  after controlling for  the  generally accepted density-
dependence model. Of course, we should take some caution in interpreting these results because of the 
limited degrees of freedom in each model!7. Still, the results open some directions for further research 
on the incentive systems used in new technology based companies. In the empirical operationalization, 
we assume that the key researchers receive equity ownership in these new companies. How does this 
degree  of equity  ownership  change  over  time?  Does  it  discriminate  between  successful  and  less 
successful new technology based companies? Is it a substitute for property rights in the initial stages of 
technological development? The incomplete contracts model,  and its  elaborated version analyzed by 
Holmstrom (1994), offers some strong, testable hypotheses for these questions. 
The second set of hypotheses were more difficult to analyze (2a and 2b), because we have no data on 
the  degree  of inter-relatedness  between  the  different  knowledge  and  physical  assets,  nor  of the 
homogeneity of the existing knowledge base. The results are therefore indications rather than empirical 
tests. These indicators confirm direction of the hypothesis: companies which have accumulated a larger 
knowledge base and hence, have built more competencies in a certain core technology are more likely 
to enter a research collaboration (in what we assume to be a weakly related new technology) than those 
that did not accumulate this knowledge base yet. These results invite further research. Collaboration and 
more specifically outsourcing in  basic research might be desirable from  an  incentive point of view. 
Further studies should go inside the firm and collect data at the project level so that the degree of inter-
relatedness between the different kinds of assets can be taken into account. 
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Clique Membership: relative number of organizations that 
belong to an industry-wide exchange network (-) 
Mimetic Isomorphism: concentration of network prestige (+) 
Density: inverted-U shaped relationship (significant) 
Control Variables 
environment specific variables. 
Dependent Variable 
foundings of new biotech firms. 
Independent Variables 
Density: inverted-U shaped relationship (significant) 
Control Variables 






aggregated density effect: inverted-U shaped relationship 
(significant) 
geographic density: density in well-defined geographic niches 
(+) 
Control variables 
general economic and social conditions such as 
Agricultural employment (n.s.) 




mass: sum of the sizes of all organizations in the population (+) 
density effect: inverted-U shaped relationship (significant) 
(+) mealls a statistically significallt (17<.05) positive siK'1. 
(-) mealls a statistically siKllijicallt (17<.05) lIel{lltive siKII. 
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(only time) with 
gamma distribution Table 2: Selection ofthe Biotech Community and the Different Subdomains 
Step 1. 
In a first step, a list of journals was selected that covered the underlying sciences in Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology. According to  the  Science Citation Index,  these fields  have  157  journals,  10% of 
which we selected. These 10% were the top 10% ranked by their impact factor as  listed in  the Science 
Citation  Index.  In  each  of these  journals  we  screened  the  "review"  articles  to  explore  emerging 
technological subfields. Each of these journals is displayed in the table below. 
List of Journals 
FIELD  !JOURNAL  .............  , ........................  __ .... --_. __ ..  _-.. _,._-_ ....  , ................ . 
Biochemistry and Molecular  i Annu Rev Biochem 
Biology (157)  i Cell 
Biotechnology and Applied 
Microbiology (43) 
Annu Rev Cell Bioi 
; Faseb J. 
i Annu Rev Bioph Biom 
. EmboJ 
i Rev Physiol Bioch P 
: Crit Rev Biochem Mol 
i Adv Enzymol Ramb 
; Prog Nucleic Acid Re 
I Mol Cell Bioi 
; Proteins 
l  J. Bioi Chern 
I Plant Cell 



















In  these journals,  we  identified  7  distinct technological  subdomains  in  pharmaceutical research:  (a) 
monoclonal antibodies which are generated through the hybridoma technology and most often used for 
diagnostic purposes; (b) protein engineering or the recombinant synthesis of polypeptides or proteins; 
(c) drug delivery systems which mainly boil down to the use of Liposomes or Ligands to enhance the 
activity  of  genes  or  biologics;  (d)  anti-sense  technology  which  focuses  on  the  recombinant 
manipulation of RNA strings instead of the classic DNA; (e) gene therapy which is the development of 
protocols  to  insert  genes  with  therapeutic  characteristics  directly  in  the  body;  (f)  recombinant 
receptors or the recombinant construction of drug targets instead of drug agents and (g) rational drug 
design or the structured modeling of molecules according to the receptor characteristics making use of 
computerized methods such as X-ray crystallography. 
Step 2. A population of biotech companies was  defined using the broadest definition as  described in 
Appendix A. The definition of Biopharmaceutical companies was as follows: 
New Biotech Based Companies which are involved in biopharmaceutical research and development 
and not fully owned (i.e. at least 75% equity position) by another company. Companies are identified 
and selected from a number of secondary datasources including BioScan, American Healthcare and 
Marketplace Guide, NDA-pipeline, Bio\Technology annual review of  ... 
Step 3. Each of the companies that was identified in step two was traced back in the sample of journals 
as  described  above.  Using  the  information  from  the  articles  in  these  journals,  we  classified  each 
company in  an  appropriate category. If  a company belonged to more than one of these categories, we 
selected that one in  which most of the articles were published. An average biotech company publishes 
about 22 articles/year. 
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number  of US  patents  filed  during  that  year  of observation.  The Derwent 
patent data base is used as  the 'population'. This database is easily accessible 
through  the  ON-LINE hosts  of DIALOG and  ORBIT.  First,  we  selected  a 
restricted popUlation of US patents based on the priority information included 
in each patent. Then, we used a search strategy to select the subsample of US 
patent filings concerning protein engineering. 
number  of US  patents  filed  during  that year  of observation.  The  Derwent 
patent data base is used as the 'population'. This database is easily accessible 
through the  ON-LINE hosts  of DIALOG and  ORBIT. First,  we selected  a 
restricted population of US patents based on the priority information included 
in each patent. Then, we used a search strategy to select the subsample of US 
patent filings concerning monoclonal antibodies (hybridoma technology). 
Foundings of New Biotech Based Companies which are involved in 
biopharmaceutical research using techniques of protein engineering or 
monoclonal antibodies (in vitro diagnostic assays excluded) and not fully 
owned (i.e. at least 75% equity position) by another company. Companies are 
identified and selected from a number of secondary datasources including 
BioScan, American Healthcare and Marketplace Guide, NDA-pipeline, 
Bio\Technology annual review of  ... lO-K reports and the NDA-pipeline were 
used to identify the strategic interest (genetic engineering/monoclonal 
antibodies) of the companies. 
The research collaboration variable is a variable collected from information 
available in the full text version of the NDA-pipeline (accessible through 
Dialog). This database contains detailed information on the drugs in 
development and their status of progress. For a detailed description of the 
sample from which this variable is drawn and the underlying data sources, we 
refer to appendix C, where a dummy version of the variable is described into 
detail. 
Dummy variable variant of the RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS variable 
described in the previous paragraph. 
The number of projects this particular company has in clinical trials during the 
period of observation. This variable is computed from the NDA-pipeline data 
for the sample of companies described in Appendix C. 
Cumulative number of patents for each of the companies in our sample. This 
variable is drawn from DERWENT's database on biotech patents. A patent is 
granted to a company in the year that company filed the patent. Again this 
variable is computed for the sample of companies described in Appendix C. 
Number of Years that the company exists. 
average size of the company in number of employees at each year of 
observation. A detailed description of how this variable was constructed is 
included in A  endix C. 
--33--Table 4: Determinants of New Tech Foundings 
Poisson Regression/Negative Binomial. Dependent Variable= Number ofNDAlPLAs. 
NUMBER 
{number of 







































*: means significant at the 0.05-level 
**: means significant at the O.Ol-level 





























0.32 Table 5: Determinants of the Decision to Enter a Research Collaboration 
ProbitlLogit Model. Dependent Variable =  1 if involved in a Research Collaboration. 557 obs. 
PATENTS {total 
number of biotech 
patents} 
Pro  bit Regression 











..............................................................................................................................................  n  ...............................................................  u  •••••••••••• 
SIZE {number of  0.006  -0.006  -0.001  0.005* 
employees}  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
··~~~  ..  ~·~:=:~~·~~  ...... T  ............  ~:~;·~~  .............. l  ..............  ~~:~~'~"""""""""""""'"~:~~'~:''''''''''''''r'''''''''''''~'~:~~'~''''''''''''''' 
years elapsed since  i  (0.0287)  i  (0.0244)  (0.0143)  i  (0.043) 
company founding}  I  I  I 
···········································1···········································r····················  ....................... ···········  .. ······························r···········  ................................  . 
CUMPAT  j  j  0.0095**  j  0.0176** 
{cumulative number  ~  ~  (0.0025)  ~  (0.0047) 








*:  means significant at the 0.05-level 
**: means significant at the O.Ol-level 
standard errors in parentheses 
-2.304** 
(00407) 
-288 
0.10 
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-4.270** 
(0.725) 
-316 
0.05 
-3.995** 
(0.767) 
-288 
0.10 / 